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The Plaintiff, Dorothy T. Morrison, moves the Court 
Judgment against the Defendants, James Michael Bestier, 
J.D. and J. Michael Bestler, M.D., Inc., doing business under 
«' g.. 
~he trade name of Cosmetic Surgery of Virginia, and in support 
ftS 
~ 
~hereof, respectfully represents as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of the area of Blue Ridge, 
County of Botetourt, State of Virginia; 
2. Defendant, James M. Bestler, M.D., is a resident 
of the City of Martinsville, State of Virginia; 
:1 
3. Defendant, J. Michael Bestler, M.D., Inc., doing 
business as Cosmetic Surgery of Virginia, is a Virginia corporation 
with offices in the County of Roanoke and the City of Martinsville; 
4. At all times mentioned herein, the Defendant, 
James Michael Bestler, M.D. and J. Michael Bestler, M.D., Inc., 
was and still is a physician and surgeon duly licensed under 
the laws of this State with offices at Professional Park, Suite 
102, Starkey Road, in the County of Roanoke, and Medical Center, 
Suite 204, 102 Hospital Dr., in the City of Martinsville; Defendant 
held himself out to the general public, and particularly to 
the Plaintiff as a surgeon, skilled in the field of cosmetic 
surgery, including neck and face lift surgery, and as such, 
able to treat Plaintiff with skill for the ailment herein mentioned 
5. Prior to and on March 10, 1982, Plaintiff's neck 
had sagging redundant skin. On February 16, 1982, Plaintiff 
believed that defendant was a surgeon skilled in the art of 
such profession and in such belief consulted defendant. Defendant 
represented to plaintiff that by removing and lifting the 
skin on her neck, the neck would be smoothed and tightened. 
6. Plaintiff believed aforesaid representations and 
in such belief, then and there employed Defendant to perform 
said operation. 
7. Thereafter, on March 10, 1982, Plaintiff, on Defen-
. dant's advice, entered Memorial Hospital of Martinsville and 
Henry County, in the City of Martinsville to enable Defendant 
to perfo~m the neck lift surgical proce~ure. Plaintiff consented 
2 
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to be placed under local anesthetic and sedation during said 
surgical procedure7 however, Plaintiff and Defendant agreed 
orally that during the surgical procedure Defendant would not 
operate on Plaintiff's face under any circumstances. 
8. On March 10, 1982, Defendant, without Plaintiff's 
consent, intentionally operated on Plaintiff's face while Plaintiff 
was under anesthesia. 
9. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's 
unauthorized operation on Plaintiff, Plaintiff sustained the 
following injuries: facial scarring and disfigurement. By 
the foregoing, the Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer 
extreme physical pain and suffering and severe nervous shock, 
depression, humiliation and mental distress, all to her damage 
in the sum of $100,000.00. 
10. As a further and direct and proximate result 
of Defendant's actions, Plaintiff will suffer the following 
speqial damages: Expenses for further surgical care. Plaintiff 
does not know the exact amount of said expenses, and she requests 
leave of Court to amend this pleading to insert said amount 
when ascertained. 
11. Defendant acted willfully and maliciously for 
which Plaintiff seeks p~nitive damages of $300,000.00. 
SECONQ CAUSE OF ACTION 
Plaintiff complains again~t the Defendant,.James M. 
Bestler, M.D.·and J. Michael Bestler, M.D., Inc., and for a 
second Cause of Action says: 
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1. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs one (1) through 
eleven (11) of her first cause of Action and makes the same 
a part thereof. 
2. On February 16, 1982, at Defendant's office, Defendant 
promised orally to tighten and remove from Plaintiff's neck 
excess skin by a surgical procedure, a necklift, and expressly 
guaranteed that said operation would not require an incision 
on Plaintiff's face. As consideration for Defendant's promises 
and guarantees and performance of said operation, Plaintiff 
paid the Defendant Seven-Hundred Dollars ($700.00) then and 
agreed to pay Seven-Hundred Dollars ($700.00) more at a later 
date. 
3. Thereafter, on March 10, 1982, Plaintiff relying 
on Defendant's representations and guarantees, entered Memorial 
Hospital of Martinsville and Henry County in the City of Martins-
ville, where Defendant attempted to remove the excess skin 
by said necklift •. Defendant, operating in an unskilled and 
negligent manner, failed to remove the excess skin and instead, 
performed a face-lift on the Plaintiff. 
4. Defendant's actions constituted a breach of his 
express guaranty to remove said excess skin without making 
an incision into Plaintiff's face. 
5. As a direct and proximate result of sa~d breach 
and said facelift, Plaintiff sustained the following injuries: 
facial scarr~ng and disfigurement. By the foregoing, ·the Pla~ntiff 
suffered and continues to suffer extreme physical pain and 
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suffering and severe nervous shock, depression, humiliation, 
mental distress, all to her damage in the sum of $100,000.00. 
6. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendant• 
action, Plaintiff will suffer special damages of expenses for 
further surgical care. Plaintiff does not know the exact amount 
of said expenses and she requests leave of Court to amend the 
pleadings to insert said amount when ascertained. 
THIRP CAUSE OF ACTION 
Plaintiff complains against the Defendants, James 
M. Bestler, _M.D. and J. Michael Bestler, M.D., Inc., and for 
a third Cause of Action says:. 
1. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs one (1) through 
eleven (11) of her first Cause of Action and Paragraphs one 
(1) through six (6) of her second Cause of Action, against 
the Defendants, James M. Bestler, M.D. and J. Michael Bestler, 
M.D., Inc., and makes the same a part hereof. 
2. On March 10, 1982, the Defendant undertook as 
a physician and surgeon to perform a necklift and facelift 
on Plaintiff. 
3. Defendant was negligent in his treatment of Plain-
tiff in that he failed to exercise the degree of skill and 
care, or to possess the degree _o£ knowledge, ordinarily exercised 
or possessed in similar cases by other surgeons, taking into 
account the existing state of knowledge and practice in the 
profession. Defendant was negligent in that he performed said 
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operation in such a manner that the Plaintiff's face on the 
right side is pulled too tight so that her right eye pulls 
down and her eyelid droops; that the right side of Defendant's 
mouth at her lip sags or droops; that the right ear stands 
out further than her left ear; that the left and right sides 
of Plaintiff's face were pulled out of symmetry; that the neck 
lift was not performed; that the pre-auricular incision did 
not closely follow the sulcus in front of the ears. The Defendant 
operated on the Plaintiff without first consulting her medical 
chart. 
4. As a proximate result of the Defendant's negligence 
Plaintiff received the following injuries: facial scarring 
and disfigurement. By the foregoing, the Plaintiff suffered 
and continues to suffer extreme physical pain and suffering, 
and severe nervous shock, depression, humiliation and mental 
distressl all to her damage in the sum of $100,000.00. 
5. As a further direct and proximate result of 
Defendant's actions, Plaintiff will suffer special damages 
of expense for further surgical care. Plaintiff does not know 
the exact amount of said expenses, and she requests leave of 
Court to amend this pleading to insert said amount when 
ascertained. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays judgment against the 
Defendants, Dr James M. Bestler, M.D. and J. Michael Bestler, 
M.D.; Inc., as follows: 
1. General damages of $300,000.00; 
2. All reasonable medical, hospital and nursing expenses, 
6 
exact amount of which is unknown to the Plaintiff at this time; 
and leave of Court will be asked to insert the true amount 
when the same has been ascertained; 
3. Punitive damages of $300,000.00; 
4. Costs of this action; and 
5. Such other and further relief as the Court may 
deem just and proper. 
c. Richard Cranwell, Esq. 
s. Amy Arbucho, Esq. 
CRANWELL, FLORA & MOORE, P.C. 
P.O. BOX 91 
Roanoke, VA 24002 
DOROTHY T. MORRISON 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
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CL84850160 LAW NO .................... . 
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"· 
James Michael Bestler, M. D·,,. Als 
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PLEA OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Come now the defendants, James Michael Bestler, M.D. 
and J. z-.tichael Bestler, M.D., Inc., d/b/a Cosmetic 
Surgery of Virginia, by counsel, and file this as their 
plea to the statute of limitations and state that the 
suit by the plaintiff against them is barred by the ap-
plicable statute of limitations. 
George w. Wooten, Esq. 
Susan A. Waddell, Esq. 
JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D. 
and 
J. MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D., INC. 
d/b/a COSMETIC SURGERY OF 
VIRGINIA, 
By=;::;,. '-"""'--~ ~. '- ~\:.\.... "-~ 
Of Counse 
Woodward, Fox, W~oten & Hart, P.C. 
P.O. Box 12247 
Roanoke, Virginia 2.4024-2247 
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WOODWARD, FOX, WOOTaN 
8: HART 
ATTORNIEYS·AT•LAW 
ROANOKE. VA. • 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Susan A. Waddell, do hereby certify that a true 
copy of the foregoing was mailed to c. Richard Cranwell, 
Esquire and s. Amy Arbucho, Esquire, Cranwell, Flora & 
Moore, P.C., P.O. Box 91, Roanoke, Virginia 24002 this 
a\~ day of November, 1984. 




ROLAND C. WOODWARD 
CHARLES D. F'OX, .m 
GEORGE w. WOOTEN 
DAVID B. HART 
GARY E. TEGENKAMP 
BEN R. LACY, m: 
BRUCE L. MERTENS 
M. LANIER WOODRUM 
L. THOMPSON MANES 
THOMAS R. MCCLELLAN 
RICHARD E. B. F'OSTER 
F'IELDING L. LOGAN, JR. 
CECil. H, CREASEY, JR. 
RICHARD L. BURGER 
.JOSEPH w. H. MOTT 
LAW OFFICES 
WOODWARD, FOX. WOOTEN S HART 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
SEVEN-0-SEVEN BUILDINC 
P. 0. BOX 12247 
ROANOKE. VIRGINIA 24024-2247 
<703) 343-2451 
December 19, 1984 
The Honorable Kenneth E. Trabue 
Circuit Court for the County of Roanoke 
Main Street and College Avenue 
Post Office Box 711 
Roanoke, Virginia 24153 
Re: Dorothy Charter Morrison 
v. J. Michael Bestler, M.D. 
Dear Judge Trabue: 
EDGAR M. ANDREWS, JR., OF' COUNSEL 
CHARLES E. MILl.S,JIL,OF' COUNSEl. 
WILLIAM E. VALENTINE, OF' COUNSEl. 
1204 SEVEN HUNDREO BUILDING 
700 EAST MAIN STREET 
RICH MONO, VIRGINIA 23219· 2656 
\804) 7~ 9633 
SUITE 318, THE CRILLEY WAREHOUSE 
218 NORTH LEE STREET ......-r.· 
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314· 2687 _.,.- / · 
(703) 836. 0645 (' /'-~1., ;. f 
/) t?J ; v' I {lfit, t-
( ~-.. - ·: ~ 'l 
, :..r· ·I \ ' \ 
I " :. l l 
\ \ 
This letter is to advise you that counsel for both parties 
have agreed to submit the defendant's plea to the statute of 
limitations on briefs, leaving either party the option to 
request a hearing after briefs have been filed. Counsel for the 
plaintiff, Amy Arbucho has agreed that their brief wil~ be 
filed on or before January 14, 1985. I, in turn, have 
ag~eed to file our responsive brief on or before January 25, 
1985. 
I hope that the Court will be amenable to this arrangement. 
If you have any questions or suggestions, please contact'me at 
my office. 
SAW/jc 
cc: S. Amy Arbucho, Esquire 
Dr. J. Michael Bestler 
12 
Very truly yours, 
~.:::.~ . ..__ ~ , \J...~c:.:.~c~'- _).. .. ,,_ 
Susan A. Waddell 
WOODWARD, FOX,. ,"EN &; HART 
VIRGINIA: 
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JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D. ) 
and J. MICHAEL BESTLER, ) 
M.D., INC., d/b/a COSMETIC ) 
SURGERY OF VIRGINIA ) 
) 
Defendants ) 
MEMORANDUM OF LAl~ IN SUPPORT 
OF THE.DEFENDANTS' PLEA OF 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
LAW NO. CL84850160 
The defendants, James Michael Best1er, M.D. (hereafter 
"Dr. Bestler") and J. M;ichael Bestler, M.D., Inc., d/b/a 
Cosmetic Surgery of Virginia (hereafter "Best1er, Inc."), by 
counsel, file this memorandum in support of their plea of 
the statute of limitations: 
FACTS 
The plaintiff gave notice of her intent to institute a 
malpractice claim by letter dated March 10, 1984, allegin~ .. 
that she had been injured bv surgerv performed by Dr. 
Bestler and Bestler, Inc. on March 10, 1982. The plaintiff 
then filed a motion for judgment against Dr. Bestler and 
Bestler, Inc. in the Roanoke County Circuit Court on March 
12, 1984, only two days after notice of claim was sent.* 
Dr. Bestler and Bestler, Inc. filed a dP.murrer and motion to 
dismiss on March 21, 1984 on the ground that the plaintiff 
had violated Va. Code Ann. § 8 .. 01-581.2 .by filing a motion 
*Dr. Bestler and Bestler, Inc. respectfully request the Court to take 
judicial notice of the prior lawsuit filed by the plaintiff against them 
on March 12, 1984 in the Circuit Court for the County of Poanoke, Law No. 
CL840087, and hereby incorporate by reference the pleadings in that suit. 
13 
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for judgment within the ninety day period following a notice 
of malpractice claim. Subsequent to a hearing on the health 
care provider's motion and demurrer, the plaintiff took a 
the plaintiff filed a new motion 
for judgment stating the same claims against Dr. Bestler and 
Bestler, Inc. Thereafter, on November 22, 1984 a plea of 
the statute of limitations was filed on behalf of Dr. 
Bestler and Bestler, Inc., which plea is the subject of this 
memorandum. 
ARGUMENT 
The Virginia Medical Malpractice Act provides the 
exclusive statutory authority for the institution of tort 
claims against health care providers. Va. Code Ann. 
§ 8.01-581.2(A) requires a claimant to give written notice 
to the health care provider setting forth the time of the 
alleged malpractice and a reasonable description of each act 
of malpractice. The statute states in pertinent part: 
No action based. on alleged malpractice shall be 
brought within ninety days of the notification by 
the claimant to the health care provider and if a 
panel is requested within the period of review by 
the medical reviP-w panel. 
Va. Code Ann. § 8. OJ.-581. 9 provides in pertinent part 
that. the giving of the notice of a malpractice claim pursu-
ant to § ·a.Ol-581.2 tolls. the applicable statute of lim:i.ta-
tions.period for a period. of 120 days from the date that the 
statute of limitations would have otherwise run (or sixty 
14 
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days following the issuance of an opinion by the Medical 
Review Panel, whichever is later). No Medical Review Panel 
has been requested by any of th~ parties in either of the 
lawsuits. 
The plaintiff filed her notice of claim on the.last day 
of the two year statute of limitation period, which was 
March 10, 1984. When the plaintiff sent her notice of claim 
to Dr. Bestler and Bestler, Inc., this triggered the opera-
tion of the ninety-day prohibition period on filing lawsuits 
mandated by § 8. 01-581.2. The plaintiff was forbidden to 
file suit by the express terms of the statute before June 9, 
1984, the date on which· the ninetv day prohj_bition period 
expired. Because June 9, 1984, the last day of the ninety 
day prohibition period, is beyond the two year statute of 
limitations period, the plaintiff had the absolute right to 
benefit from the 120 day tolling provision of § 8.01-581.9, 
so that her filing deadline would have been July 8, 1984 
instead of March 10, 1984. The plaintiff could have proper-
ly filed her motion for judgment no earlier than June 9, 
1984 and no later than Julv 8, 1984. Instead, the plai~tiff 
filed her motion for judgment on March 12, 1984, only two 
days after the notice of malpractice claim was mailed to Dr. 
Bestler and Bestler, Inc. and in clear violation ~f 
§ 8 ~ 01-581.2. :Recause filing a medical malpractice action 
within the ninety day prohibition period is absolutely 
15 
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forbidden, this Court had no jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff's claim, therefore the lawsuit filed March 12, 
1984 is null and void. 
The plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit on November 16, 
1984 and refiled her motion for judgment on November 17, 
1984. November 17, 1984 is several months beyond the date 
on which the applicable statute of limitations period 
expired. Therefore, this action may not be maintained 
against Dr. Bestler and Bestler, Inc. and must be dismissed. 
The .saving provision of Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-229(E)(3) 
is of no benefit to the plaintiff in this case. 
statute provides in pertinent part as follows: 
If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit as 
prescribed in § 8.01-380, the statute of limita-
tions with respect to such actions shall be tolled 
by the commencement of the nonsuited action, and 
the plaintiff may recommence his action within six 
months from the date he suffers such nonsuit, or 
within. the original period of limitation, whichev-· 
er period is longer. 
That 
Section 8.01-229(E)(3) contemplates that the Court entering 
a nonsuit has subject matter jurisdiction over the plain-
tiff's motion for judgment. The Court had no subject matter 
jurisdiction over this plaintiff's original motion for 
judgment because a lawsuit filed within the ninety day 
prohibition period mandated by § 8. 01-581.2 is absolutely 
forbidden and therefore null and void. 
The above-stated position is supported by recent 
Virginia cases. In Baker v. Zirkle, 226 Va. 7, 307 S.E.2d 
16 
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234 ( 1983) the Court stated that "As a result of Code 
§ 8. 01-581.2, a medical malpractice claimant is absolutelv 
forbidden from filing an action until ninety days after 
notification to the health care provider .... Id. (emphasis 
added). See also Dye v. ·stanley, 226 Va. 15, 307 S.E.2d 237 
(1983). The phrase "absolutely forbidden" leaves no room 
for ambiguity or uncertainty. Compliance with this statuto-
ry mandate is an absolute condition precedent to litigation. 
Because the plaintiff failed to satisfy the statutory 
mandate by filing within the prohibition period, the Roanoke 
County Circuit Court never acquired jurisdiction over the 
plaint; iff's original moti.on for judgment. 
Any decree or order entered by a court without juris-
diction is void and of no effect. Farant Investment Corp. 
v. Francis, 138 Va. 417, 122 S.E. 141 (1924). This Court 
had no jurisdiction over the p lain·tiff' s original motion for 
judgment .. Therefore,.any order entered by the Court thereon 
is null and void, including the nonsuit order. Because the 
nonsuit order entered by the Court on November 16, 1.984 was 
void, the saving provision contained in § 8.01-229 is 
inapplicable and cannot protect the plaintiff from the 
expiration of the two-year statute of limitations period. 
The recent decision of Judge Fred L. Hoback in Martin 
v. Myers, ~aw No. 1854 <9ircuit Court City of Salem, Febru-
ary 15, 1983) supports the a-bove-s.tated argument~· In Martin 
v. Myers, the court indicated that § 8. 01-229 .does not 
17 
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operate to extend the statute of limitations period if the 
plaintiff fails to comply with § 8.01-581.2. See Letter of 
Judge Fred L. Hoback, dated February 15, 1983 contained in 
the court file, Law No. 1854. 
An additional reason why§ 8.01-229(E)(3) is inapplica-
ble to the case at bar is that the plaintiff's original 
motion for judgment was not filed within any applicable 
statute of limitations period, as required by Va. Code Ann. 
§ 8. 01-228. · Section 8. 01-228 sets forth verv specific 
limitations under which § 8.01-229(E)(3) is to be applied. 
The first sentence of § 8. 01-228 provides: "Every action 
for which a limitation period is prescribed by law must be 
commenced with the period prescribed by this chapter unless 
otherwise specifically provided in this Code." In order to 
benefit from the provisions of§ 8.01-229(E)(3), the plain-
tiff must have filed her initial motion for judgment within 
some prescribed limitation period, which did not occur in 
the present case. Although § 8.01-581.9 gives the plaintiff 
a 120 day statute of limitations extension, the purpose of 
that 120 day time extension is to compensate the plaintiff 
for having to wait ninety days before commencing her action 
after giving notice of a malpractice claim. Baker v. 
Zirkle, 226 Va. 7, 307 S.E.2d 234, (1983). Because the 
plaintiff has failed to comply with the niandatory provis.ions 
of § 8.01-581.2, she cannot claim the benefit of the 120 day 




WOODWARD. FOX.\ EN & HART 
Reading § § 8. 01-581.2 and 8. 01-581.9 together, along 
with the facts of the case, the plaintiff must have 
commenced her action between June 9, 1984 and July 8, 1984 
inclusive. Only if she commenced her action between those 
dates does she meet the requirements of ~ 8.01-228 that the 
suit must be cotmnenced within some prescribed limitation 
period so as to benefit from that tolling provision. The 
plaintiff must comply with § 8. 01-581.2 by filing after 
ninety days of giving her notice of a malpractice claim 
before she can claim the benefits of § 8. 01-581.9, which 
tolls the applicable statute of limitations period for 120 
days. The plaintiff in this case has not complied with 
§ 8. 01-581.2 and cannot therefore claim the benefits of 
§ 8.01-581.9. Consequently, § 8. 01-229 (E) ( 3) does not 
operat~ to toll the statute of limitation period in this 
case. Because the saving provision of § 8.01-229 does not 
apply, the pla:f.ntiff' s preset'l.t motion for judgment is 
clearly barred by the two yP.ar statute of limitations and 
must be dismissed. 
Based on the arguments and authorities presented above, 
Dr. Bestler and Bestler, Inc. respectfully move the Court to 
sustain their· plea of the statute of limitations and to 
dismiss the plaintiff's motion for judgment against them. 
JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D. 
J. MICHAEl BESTLER, M.D., INC. 
d/b/a COSMETIC SURGERY OF VIRGINIA 
-=- • 
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WOODWARD, FOX, WOOTEN & F~RT, P.C. 
Post Office Box 12247 
Roanoke, Virginia 24024-2247 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I herebv certify that a true copy of the foregoing 
memorandum of law ~ras mailed to S. Amy Arbucho, Esquire, 
Cranwell, Flora & Moore, P.C., Post Office Box 91, Vinton, 
Virginia 24179, counsel for the plaintiff, this :.:,-:::;.~ day 
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On M~rch 10, 1982, Dorothy Morrison received cosmetic 
surgery from Dr. Bestler at his clinic. On Saturday, March 
10, 1984, Mrs. Morrison gave notice to Dr. Bestler and J. 
Michael Bestler, M.D., Inc. of her intent to file a medical 
malpractice suit because of injuries she had suffered from the 
surgery two ( 2) years earlier. Mrs. l-1orrison actually filed 
her suit within the two (2) years on Monday, Marc_h 12, 1984 
(See Section 1-13.3:1). on March 21,· 1984-defendan~s filed a 
motion styled as a "Demurrer and Motion to Dismiss" alleging 










therefore barred by Virginia Code Section 8. 01-581.2. The 
defendants asked for no hearing on its motion, nor requested a 
review panel within the stately period. · After the passing of 
the statutory time, the defendants moved the court to dismiss 
plaintiff's action as barred by the statute of limitations. 
At the hearing, the defendants suggested a voluntary nonsuit 
so that the action could be tried and resolved on the statute 
of limitations as well as the merits. The Court concurred in 
that suggestion. 
On November 16, 1984, plaintiff took a voluntary 
nonsuit pursuant to Virginia Code Section 8.01-380 and filed a 
second motion for judgment on the next day. Defendants now 
contend 1:hat the second motion for judgment is barred by the 
statute of limitations. Plaintiff responds in this 
memorandum. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT RAISED THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS DEFENSE 
The issue argued before the court has not been 
properly raised by defendants, and therefor·e d·efendants cannot 
avail of a statute of limitations defense. Defendants 
responded to the original motion for judgment with a "Demurrer 
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and Motion to Dismiss". A demurrer is an allegation that the 
facts pleaded by the opposing party are not sufficient, as a 
matter of law, to support a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. Therefore, a demurrer differs from a pleading in 
that a pleading interposes allegations on the basis of fact 
while a demurrer is an objection based exclusively on law. A 
demurrer is insufficient to raise the statute of limitation 
defense in this case because the facts contained in the motion 
for judgment do not give rise to the conclusion that plaintiff 
failed to allow ninety days between notifying defendants of 
her intent to sue and actually filing suit. Neither of the 
motions for judgments even mention plaintiff's provision of 
notice pursuant to the Code. 1 
It is long established in Virginia, as in the rest of 
the common law world, that the statute of limitations must be 
raised as a defense in order to effect dismissal of a claim. 
See~ Clayton v. Henley, 73 Va. 65 (1879). Defendants have 
failed to meet this requirement by demurring because a 
demurrer is but a motion of law and not a plea. See Section 
r;~~--f-ai_l_u_r_e--~0 allege provision of notice is not a flaw in 
the .motion for judgment, · and therefore .not reachable by 
demurrer. For at least three hundred . and fifty ( 3 50) years, 
the rule of law has been that a plaintiff need not allege facts 
to show compliance with the statute of limitations as such a 
requirment would be "more prolix than convenient". Hawkins v. 
Billhead, 79 Eng. Rep. 951 (K.B. 10 Car. I 1635). 
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8.01-235. The appropriate way to raise the issue would be a 
special plea of statute of limitations. As defendants have not 
pleaded the defense, they have not raised it and therefore 
defendants have, to this day, not raised the issue. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT IS NOT BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Despite failing to raise the issue properly, 
defendants• memorandum argues that the plaintiff's second 
motion for judgment violates the statute of limitations. 
Defendants allege two (2) ways in which the second motion for 
judgment violates the statute of limitations: 1) The court 
did not have jurisdiction over the first motion for judgment 
a·nd 2) the extension of the statute of limitations provided 
for nonsuited actions cannot apply if the statute of 
limitations is not met by the original motion. 
A. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over This Case 
Defendants allege that because Virginia Code Section 
8.01-581.2 provides that: 
"No .actipn based on alleged malpractice 
shall be brought within ninety days of 
the notification by the ·claimant to the 
health care provider • • " 
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then any suit brought less than ninety (90) days after 
notification is outside the court's jurisdiction. Defendants 
cite no case law to support this bold assertion because no 
such law exists. Violation of_ a statute of limitations has 
never been the basis for depriving a court of subject matter 
j ur isdic tion. (See Section 8. 01-23 5) • This court's 
jurisdiction over malpractice cases is provided by Virginia 
Code Section 17-123 a·nd by James v. Powell, 154 VA 96, 152 
S.E. 539 (1930). 
Defendants base their contention on two grounds. The 
first is a Virginia Supreme Court decision which stated in 
dicta that a malpractice plaintiff is "absolutely forbidden" 
from filing suit within the ninety days "cooling off" period 
provided by Virginia Code Section 8!01-581.2. This statement 
arose in the case of a plaintiff who filed after the ninety 
day period. The Supreme Court of Virginia has never held that 
a plaintiff who filed a medical malpractice suit within ninety 
days of notifying the health care provider has no claim before 
the court or rather that the Court was without subject matter 
. jurisdiction. The. Virginia Supreme Court has certainly ·never 
held that Circuit Court has "no jurisdiction" ·_aver a suit 
because a plaintiff's claim was within the "cooling off" 
period. 
25 
If the defendants' argument on jurisdiction is 
carried to its logical extension, we would have this absurd 
situation. If, in fact, during the ninety day "cooling off" 
period, the Court is without subject jurisdiction, the 
defendants could have answered, gone through the discovery 
process, actually have had the trial and defended the suit, 
and later attacked any adverse judgment on the basis that the 
court lacked jurisdiction. This is true because, if the court 
is without j ur isdic tion, the parties cannot even confer 
jurisdiction by consent. See Tackle v. Hubbard 122 va. 379, 
( 1918 ) ; She 1 ton v • S i g n e r 12 6 V a • 6 2 5 , ( 19 2 0 ) • Sec t ion 
8. 01-581.2 was never intended to deprive a circuit court of 
its jurisdiction over the subject matter of a malpractice 
claim during the ninety day "cooling off" period. The ninety 
day period is nothing more than a cooling off period in which 
if a suit is prematurely filed, it would be subject to the 
right of absolute dismissal during that ninety-day period. 
Surely, it was not the legislative intent to divest 
the circuit courts of their subject matter jurisdiction during 
the ninety-day p~riod. 
Section 8.01-581 was never intended to allow a health 
care provider to pursue a course of action as the defendants 
did in this case to (i) never request a malpractice review 
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panel, (ii) wait until after the expiration of the ninety-day 
period to ask for a hearing on its demurrer and motion to 
quash, and (iii) then succeed in having·the plaintiff's claim 
barred by using form over substance. Clearly, the defendants' 
sole strategy in this case was to create some a formal 
·-
argument based on an unprecedented legal assertion rather than 
rely on a substantial argument based on the facts to defeat 
the plaintiff's claim. This is evidenced by the fact that the 
defendants never requested a malpractice review panel and 
waited until after the expiration of the ninety day period to 
raise the issues with respect to the court's jurisdiction. 
A circuit court's jurisdiction is provided by the 
Constitution and Section 17-123 of the Code and the subject 
matter jurisdiction is not divested during the ninety-day 
"cooling off" period provided in Section 8. 01-581 (2). That 
section does grant the defendant the right, absolutely, within 
the "cooling off" period to have an action dismissed. If the 
defendant is not diligent in pursuing its right to have such 
action dismissed, then after the expiration of 90 days, a 
defendant cannot be heard to object to the·filing of the suit 
on the basis of form. Simply put,· the defendant never 
requested a medical malpractice review panel, and would find 
himself standing in the same position as he is today had the 
suit been filed after the ninety-day cooling off period. 
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The defendants' second ground for arguing the Court's 
failure of jurisdiction are the words of Section Code 
8.01-581.2: "No action ••• shall be brought". These words 
also appear in other limitation statutes such as Virginia Code 
Section 8.01-245 (the statute of limitation on actions on a 
bond of a fiduciary), but the Virginia courts have never held 
that a plaintiff's failure to comply with the statute of 
limitations deprives the court of jurisdiction to adjudicate 
an action on a fiduciary's bond. Rather, the statute of 
limitation is a defense upon which a court has the right to 
dismiss an untimely suit. 
Standing alone, the statutory grant of jurisdiction 
nails the coffin shut on the contention that the Circuit Court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a medical malpractice 
suit. The fact that the statute of limitations must be raised 
as defense buries this assertion. 
Because a defense of the statute of limitations must 
be raised by a defendant, the failure to timely raise the 
issue will make good judgment against the defendant. See 
McCartney v •. Tyrer 94 Va. 198, 26 S.E., 419 (1897). To test 
the defendants' assertion that the Circuit Court never 
acquired jurisdiction on plaintiff's claim because it violated 
the statute of limitations, one need only consider the logical 
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result of the hypothesis. If defendants are correct, they 
need not even appear in court as this court's judgment, even a 
judgment in default, would be unenforceable. There fore, the 
hypothetical dilatory defendant doctor could evade a judicial 
lien for years and then have the judgment struck down because 
an order form the court lacking jurisdiction is null and void. 
B. Plaintiff's Second Motion for Judgment Does Not 
Violate the Statute of Limitations 
Defendants' other argument, that the saving provision 
of the statute of limitations does not preserve the second 
motion for judgment, is really just a mild restatement of the 
jurisdiction argument. The essence of the second argument is 
that the court's nonsuit on the original motion for judgment 
was invalid and the invalid! ty of the nonsuit order prevents 
the saving statute from taking effect. 
Defendants first attack the validity of the orde~ of 
dismissal for nonsuit by claiming that the Circuit Court had 
no jurisdiction to · issue a nonsuit order. Defendants cite 
Farant Investment Corp. v. Francis 138 Va. 417, L22 S.E. 141 
(1924) ·and l.ift part. of the Court's language ~o support the 
contention that "any decree· or order entered by a court 
without jurisdiction is void and of no effect". (Defendants' 
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Memorandum at 5) • From their inaccurate statement of the 
Farant court's holding, the defendants conclude that "any 
order entered by the courts [on the first Motion for Judgment] 
is null and void, including the nonsuit order". (Defendants' 
Memorandum at 5) • Defendants erred in citing Farant because a 
quick glance at the actual language of the case defeats 
defendants' argument. The Farant court held that any decree 
or order of a court without jurisdiction except for a 
dismissal is without effect. Farant, 138 va. at 427, 122 S.E. 
at 144. A voluntary nonsuit is a dismissal. In fact, the 
title of the relevant code section, Va. Code Section·8.01-380, 
is "Dismissal of action by nonsuit". Therefore, this court 
had jurisdic·tion to dismiss the suit and defendants' first 
argument collapses. 
Defendants' second argument fares no better. At page 
six (6) of their memorandum, defendants claim that Virginia 
Code Section 8. 01-228 controls Section 8. 01-229 (E) (3) • The 
"limitation" to which defendants advert is "Every action for 
-which a limitation period is prescribed by· law must be 
. commenced with [sic] the period prescribed by this chapter 
unless otherwise specifically prescribed in this ·Gode". .From 
this quotation, defendants conclude that Section 
8 • 0 1- 2 2 9 (E) ( 3 ) w i 11 not a p p 1 y if p 1 a inti f f vi o 1 at ed the 
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statute of limitations. 
least three (3) reasons. 
Defendants nonsequitur fails for at 
The first reason that Section 8.01-228 cannot limit 
the application of Section 8. 01-229 (E) ( 3) arises from the 
fundamental premise of statutory construction that; specific 
statutory provision will always control a general provision. 
Virginia Code Section 8.01-228 is a catchall provision which 
states that those claims that do not have spec~fic limitations 
statutes are to be governed by Chapter 4 of title 8. 01. 
Section 229(E) (3) is a specific provision of the same chapter 
which extends the statute of limitations for nonsuited 
plaintiffs by six (6) months. Section 229 (E) (3) does not 
require that a plaintiff comply with the statute of 
limitations; indeed, it does not have to do so to achieve this 
effect. (This point is discussed at page 11 of this 
memorandum) • 
The second reason why Section 8.01-228 cannot limit 
the saving statut~ • s application to this case appears in the 
very language defendants quote. The relevant statute of 
limitations for medical malpractice cases appears in ·sections 
8. 01-581.2 .and 8. 01-581.9 of the Co9e of Virginia-. . Those 
sections are in Chapter 21.1, 
4. Therefore, the word, 
of title 8.01, not in Chapter 
11 unless 11 in Section 8. 01-228 
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specifically exempts medical malpractice claims from any 
effect Section 8.01-228 may have. 
The third reason that Section 8.01-228 cannot void 
the effect of Section 8.01-229(E) (3) suggests the real issue 
in this case.· The third reason is that Section 8.01-229(E) (3} 
·is not only a "period prescribed in this chapter", it is an 
exception to the words "must be commenced" as the saving 
provision in "specifically provided in this Code". Virginia 
Code Section 8. 01-2 29 (E) (3) explicitly allows any plaintiff 
who suffers a voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Section 8.01-380 
to recommence her action within six (6) months without fear 
that the statute of limitations will run out on her. 
Arguing that Section 8.01-228 bars the application of 
Virginia's saving statute and that the court has no 
jurisdiction over a malpractice claim are disingenuous 
attempts to evade the real issue in this case. The only issue 
defendants could fairly present to this court is whether the 
court has the ability to reform a premature motion for 
judgment into a ripe claim by granting a dismissal by 
voluntary nonsuit and applying the saving provision to prevent 
statute of limitation attacks. The reason the defendants 
evade this issue by presenting glorifications of bad form over 
real substance is that no equitable, legal or sensible policy 
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supports dismissal of Mrs. Morrison's claim. Indeed, the most 
glaring omission in defendants' memorandum is their total 
failure to describe an cognizable prejudice to themselves or 
the legal system stemming from the Court's grant of a 
nonsuit. Conversely, all the policies of the Medical 
Malpractice Act and the statute of limitations are served by 
allowing Mrs. Morrison to recommence her suit against the 
doctor who injured her. 
The Medical Malpractice Act provides a ninety (90) 
day "cooling off" period in which no suit may be commenced 
against a health care provider. The ninety (90) day restraint 
allows a panel of medical and legal experts to examine a 
malpractice claim at the. request of either par~y and suggest 
an administrative remedy to the dispute. Neither Dr. Bestler 
nor Mrs. Morrison wished to take advantage of the 
administrative remedy, so defendants were not harmed by 
institution of the suit so soon after notification of the 
claim. In fact, the defendants' receipt of the motion for 
judgment provided their defense counsel with add±tional 
notice. 
The purpose of_ the statute of limitations is "to 
·suppress fraudulent and late claims from being asserted after 
a great lapse of time, to the surpr i:;e of the parties, when 
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the evidence may be lost, the facts may have become obscure 
because of defective memory or witnesses who have died or 
disappeared 11 • Street v. Consumers Mining Corp., 18 5 Va. 561, 
575, 39 S.E. 2d 271, 277 (1946). Plainly, the goals of the 
statute are not violated in this case as defendants, far from 
being surprised, by a claim, received early notice of 
plaintiff's resolve to sue. 
Even under the standard two (2) year provision of the 
statute of limitations, plaintiff's notice was timely. 
Although March 12, 1984 is two (2) years and two (2) days 
after the injury occurred, March 10, 1984 was a Saturday. 
Under Virginia Code Section 1-13.3:1, a statutory deadline 
which falls on Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday is extended 
unti 1 the next business day. March 12 I 19 84 I the following 
Monday, was the next business day, so defendants received 
timely notice irrespective of the Medical Malpractice Act. 
Finally, allowing plaintiff to reform a premature 
suit by taking a voluntary nonsuit and ref iling the new suit 
is the practical, sound and legally accepted way to justly 
deal with the technical er~~r. Virginia Code Section 8.01-380. 
provides that .a pl~intiff may take one voluntary n·on~uit as a 
rna tter of right. The saving provision states in relevant 
part: 
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If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary 
nonsuit as prescribed in Section 
8.01-380 and shall recommence his action 
within six months, the statute of 
limitations with respect to such action 
shall be tolled by th·e commencement of 
the nonsuited action. 
Taking the two provisions together, every plaintiff has the 
right to ex.tend the statute of limitations by six (6) months 
plus the pendency of his original motion for judgment provided 
he takes a nonsuit. If a plaintiff filed his original motion 
for judgment after the statute of limitations had expired and 
then took a nonsuit, the saving provision could not prevent a 
dismissal of the second action because each day of the extra 
six {6) months would relate back to a day in which the statute 
of limitations had already expired. In this way, the policy 
0 f eX C 1 U d i n g S t a 1 e C 1 a i m S i S We 11 S e r V e d by 5 ec t i 0 n 
8.01-229 (E) (3). 
In this case, however, no such policy could be served 
because plaintiff's claim was never stale, only premature, and 
the saving statute should not foreclose plaintiff's claim. 
The second motion for judgment, granted as a matter of right, 
does not relate back to a time before which the malpractice 
suit could .be filed. Instead, it should relate to the period 
in which the malpractice suit could be filed; ninety {90) days 
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after provision of notice to defendants. The statute itself 
suggests this interpretation be<?ause tolling the statute of 
limitations prevents the time in which a plaintiff may sue 
from running out. As plaintiff could not sue in the ninety 
(90) day period, no reason exists to interpret tolling a 
limitation period as toling the time in the ninety day period 
prescribed by Section 8.01-581.2. 
Most jurisdictions that have considered the point 
agree that to toll the time when a suit is barred is contrary 
to the intention of saving statutes. See Ferguson Statutes of 
Limitation Saving Statutes, Michie, 1978 pp. 342-343 (citing 
< 
14 cases) • In Security Insurance Co. of New Haven v. United 
llites, 338 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1964) for example, the Second 
Circuit rejected the strict relation back theory which would 
have barred the plaintiff from maintaining his action because 
the court found the defendant's attempt to bar a premature 
suit after it had ripened a "legal merry-go-round". In this 
case, defendants d.o not even provide a calliope as they have 
failed to properly raise the statute of limitations issue, 
present no argument of law to support their ·bizarre 
jurisdictional allegations, and most importantly·, cannot 
provide a single justification· for barring Mrs. Morrison's 
suit. Defendants claim is purely, and unabashedly, one of 
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form without legal or equitable substance and which attempts 
to place form above substance. The plaintiff therefore 
respectfully requests that the court overrule defendants' 
demurrer. 
c. Richard Cranwell, Esq. 
CRANWELL, FLORA & MOORE 
P.O. Box 91 
Roanoke, VA 24002 
DOROTHY T. MORRISON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this the ~~day of August, 1986, I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing to George W. Wooten, Esq., 
Wo~dward, Fox, Wooten & Hart, P.C., -P.O. Box 12247, Roanoke, 
Virginia 24024-2247, counsel for defendant. . ~
-£L~~ ~ ... 
-of Counsel 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF ROANOKE 






JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D. ) 
~D ) 
JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D., ) 
INC. ) 
D/B/A COSMETIC SURGERY OF ) 
VIRGINIA ) 
REPLY MEMORANDUM 
OF JAMES MICHAEL 
BESTLER, M.D., ~D 
JAMES MICHAEL 
BESTLER, M.D., INC. 
. ,.. =--· .... 
···: 
) {.n ---~ 
Defendants ) 
The defendants James Michael Bestler, M.D. (her~ftep 
:., ... 
"Dr. Bestler") and James Michael Bestler, M.D., Inc., d/b/a 
Cosmetic Surgery of Virginia (hereafter "Bestler, Inc."), by 
counsel, file this memorandum in support of their plea of 
the Statute of Limitations. 
ISSUES OF FACT 
The plaintiff's statement of facts misstates the 
procedural history of the case. Plaintiff's notice of claim 
was given by letter dated March 10, 1984. Plaintiff then 
filed a motion for judgment against Dr. Bestler and Bestler, 
Inc. in this court on March 12, 1984, only two days after 
notice of claim w~s sent. Both defendants filed a demurrer 
and a motion to dismiss to the ini tia1 lawsui_t on the ground 
that the plaintiff had violated Va. Code Ann .. S 8.01-581~2. 
Subsequent to a ·hearing on the health care· providers' 
demurrer, the plaintiff took a voluntary non-suit on Novem-
ber 16, 1984. 
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on Novemeer 17, 1984, the plaintiff filed her motion 
for judgment in this case against Dr. Bestler and Bestler, 
Inc. Thereafter, on November 22, 1984, defendants filed a 
plea of the Statute of Limitations. Defendants at no time 
raised the issu~ of the Statute of Limitations prior to the 
dismissal of the first lawsuit, as suggested by plaintiff in 
her brief. Further, defendants never at any time at the 
hearing on the demurrer and motion to dismiss in the first 
suit suggested that plaintiff take a voluntary non-suit, as 
stated by plaintiff in her memorandum. 
Plaintiff suggests that the defendants took advantage 
of her by failing to ask for an immediate heating on their 
demurrer and motion to dismiss, however, in that pleading, 
defendants plainly stated its position that no lawsuit could 
be filed within 90 days from the date of notice of claim. 
Despite this clear and plain statement of the law, plaintiff 
ignored defense counsel's warning and did not file its claim 
during the time period permitted ~Y the Medical Malpractice 
Act. ARGUMENT 
I. Defendants have properly raised the Statute of 
Limitations defense. 
Plaintiff argues that defendants have not properly 
raised the Statute of Limitations defense. Although defen-
dants' response to the original motion for judgment was a 
demurrer and motion to dismiss, that action was voluntarily 
non-suited, and the procedural propriety of the demurrer and 
motion to dismiss in plaintiff's first action is not an 
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issue in the case at bar. In this case defendants have 
filed a plea to the Statute of Limitations, a fact which 
plaintiff has ignored. The plea of the Statute of Limita-
tions was mailed to Richard Cranwell and Amy Arbucho on the 
21st day of November, 1984 and the original was timely filed 
with the court. By letter of February 19th, 1985, to the 
court, counsel for the plaintiff acknowledged that a plea of 
the Statute of Limitations was filed in this case. Thus, 
the plaintiff's argument on this issue has no application. 
II. Plaintiff's motion for judgment is barred~ the 
Statute of Limitations. 
As stated in Defendants' prior brief, filing a medical 
malpractice action within the 90 day prohibition period of 
§ 8.01-581.2 is absolutely forbidden and therefore the 
lawsuit filed on March 12, 1984, is null and void. There is 
ample support for this proposition. As stated in Baker ~ 
Zirkle, 226 Va. 7, 307 S.E. 2d 234 (1983): "a medical 
malpractice claimant is absolutely forbidden from filing an 
action until ninety days after notification to the health 
care provider ••• "(emphasis added). ~~Dye Y.:.. Staley, 
226 Va 15, 307 S.E. 2d 237 (1983); Horn v. Abernathy, 343 
S.E. 2d 318 (Va. 1986). Since compliance with the statutory 
mandate is an absolute condition precedent to litigation, 
the circuit court for Roanoke County never acquired juris-
diction over the plaintiff's first. motion for judgment •. Any 
decree or order entered by court without jurisdiction is 
void and of no effect, even a non-suit order. §!! Farant 
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Investment Corporation v. Francis, 138 Va 417, 122 s.E. 141 
(1924). 
The Court in Farant Investment Corporation v. Francis, 
supra, specifically stated as foll~ws: 
There are, indeed, four essential requisites 
to confer upon a court "active jurisdiction," 
which may be thus classed, (1) potential juris-
diction, (2) territorial jurisdiction, (3) actual jurisdiction of the subject matter where the 
proceeding is in ~, and also· of the proper 
parties where the proceeding is personal, and (4) 
the other conditions of fact must exist which are 
demanded by the unwritten or Statute law as the 
perequisites of the authority of the court to 
proceed to judgment or decree". Farant, supra, 
138 Va at 427-28. 
Obviously, plaintiff has not complied with va Code ~ 
§ 8.01-581.2, which is a statutory prerequisite to the 
court's acquiring jurisdiction over this case. Accordingly, 
plaintiff's first suit is a nullity. 
The Circuit Court for the City of Salem, ruled on the 
same proposition in the case of Martin v. Meyers, referred 
to in plaintiff's prior memorandum. ~Martin v. Meyers, 
Law No. 1854 (Circuit Court City of Salem, February 15, 
1983). counsel for the plaintiff has neither discussed nor 
distinguished the Meyers case, in which Judge Hoback sus-
tained defendants plea of the Statute of Limitations on very 
similar facts. Martin's cause of action accrued on December 
11, 1979. on December 10, 1981 he filed his first suit in 
the Roanoke City Circuit Court, without .giving notice of 
claim. When this issue was raised in the proceeding in the 
Roanoke City Circuit Court, the plaintiff moved for a non 
suit and. a non-suit was entered on March 10, 1982. 
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Thereafter, on July 6, 1982, the plaintiff, gave notice to 
the defendant pursuant to the medical malpractice act, § 
8.01-581.2. When no review panel was requested the plain-
tiff filed his action on October 28, 1982. On those facts, 
the court granted defendants plea of the Statute of Limita-
tions, approving counsel's argument that plaintiff's failure 
to comply with Va Code ~ § 8.01-581.2 deprives the court 
of jurisdiction over the lawsuit filed in the absence of 
notice. 
It should be noted here that defendants are not arguing 
that the court is deprived of jurisdiction over the original 
lawsuit because of plaintiff's failure to comply with the 
Statute of Limitations, rather, defendants position is that 
plaintiff's first suit was a nullity because of plaintiff's 
failure to comply with § 8.01-581.2, which states a statuto-
ry condition precedent to plaintiff's right of action. 
Since the original lawsuit is a nullity it does not operate 
to toll the Statute of Limitations under va. Code ~· § 
8.01-229 (E)(3) and the instant suit is time barred. 
In sub paragraph B of plaintiff's memorandum, she 
argues that a non-suit is a dismissal that comes within the 
exception to the normal rule that any decree or order of the 
court without jurisdiction is null and void. It·is basic 
hornbook +aw that any judgment that would have been rendered 
on·plaintiff's original action would have been void and of 
no effect. See·Michie's Jurisprudence, vel. II-A-Judgments 
and Decrees, §145, p. 199. It is also basic hornbook law 
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that all proceedings in a void suit are ineffective to bind 
or afford protection to anyone. Id. These include a non-
suit. 
The non-suit provisions of 8.01-229(E)(3) anticipate 
that the non-suited action would be filed within some 
prescribed limitation period. Although, § 8.01-581.9 gives 
the plaintiff 120 days Statute of Limitations extension, the 
purpose of the 120 day time extension is to compensate the 
plaintiff for having to wait ninety days before commencing 
an action after giving notice to the malpractice claim. 
Baker~ Zirkle, 226 va 7,307 s.E. 2d 234 (1983). Because 
the plaintiff has not waited for the required for the. 
required 90 days, she cannot now claim the benefit of the 
120 days Statute of Limitation extension. 
In plaintiff's memorandum, plaintiff refers 
frequently to the legislative intent behind § 8.01-581.2, 
yet the plaintiff states no authority for his assertions of 
legislative intent. The plaintiff opines that the 90 day 
period for which suit cannot be filed is a "cooling off 
period" that permits a panel of medical legal experts to 
examine the claim at the request of either party and suggest 
an administrative remedy to the dispute. Plaintiff goes on 
to state without any authority that Dr. Bestler did not 
wish to take advantage of the administrati~e remedy. ·In 
fact, because plaintiff · i~ediately filed this· motion for 
judgment, neither defendant ·had the opportunity to take 
advantage of an administrative remedy. The very evil 
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plaintiff suggests the Statute was designed to prevent has 
occurred in this case. Defendants were effectively prevent-
ed from enjoying the "cooling off period" described by 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiff states incorrectly that the Statute of 
Limitations in a medical malpractice case is stated in 
§ 8.01-581.2 and § 8.01-581.9 of the Virginia Code. The 
applicable Statute of Limitations for medical malpractice 
action as for any other personal injury action is the two 
year Statute of Limitations set forth in va ~ Ann § 
8.01-243. Section 8.01-581.9 is a tolling provision, as is 
§ 8.01-229. 
The only new authority plaintiff's cites in support of 
his position is the case of Security Insurance Company of 
New Haven, Connecticut~ United States, 338 F 2d 444 (9th 
Cir. 1964). The case arose under the Miller act, which 
provided at· the time that a materialman who was not been 
paid in full "before the expirati.on of a period of ninety 
days after the day on which the last of the labor was done 
or perfor.med ••. shall have the right to sue on such payment 
bond for the amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid at the 
time of institution of such suit." Plaintiff filed his 
complaint less than ninety days after the last day upon 
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so that the action was premature under the terms of the 
Miller act. The Court determined that these limitations in 
the Miller act were limitations on the action and not 
conditions precedent to the filing of suit, i.e., these 
limitations were in the nature of Statute of Limitations. 
Accordingly, the doctrine of relation back was applied to 
plaintiff's subsequently filed supplemental pleading to 
preserve his cause of action. Id. at 449. 
In reaching this decision, in the 9th Circuit distin-
guished a decision by the United States Supreme Court based 
on facts more similar to those in the case of bar, United 
States v. McCord, 233 u.s. 157 (1914). In that case the 
Supreme Court was construing a different version of the 
Miller Act, which provided that a materialman could file 
suit: "If no suit should be brought by the United States 
within six months from the completion and final settlement 
of said contract." ML_ at 161-62. In that case, the 
plaintiff brought an action within the six month prohibition 
period. The Supreme Court held that the Statute did not 
place a limitation upon a cause of action previously exist-
ing, but created a new right of action upon the terms named 
in the Statute~ Id. at 162. The Court held that the right 
of action was conditioned upon the failure of the United 
States to bring suit within the six month time period, and 
that this condition was part of the right conferred, without 
which there would be no liability. Id. 
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Obviously, the earlier version of the Miller Act is 
analagous to the statute being construed in this case. The 
earlier version, (Act of August 13, 1894, 28 Statute 278 as 
amended by the act of February 24, 1905, 22 Statute 811), 
provided in mandatory terms plaintiff could not file suit 
unless the United States failed to bring suit within six 
months from the completion and final settlement of the 
contract. Similarly, va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.2 states 
manditorily that no malpractice claim shall be filed within 
ninety days of notice of claim. The Medical Malpractice Act 
does not place a limitation on the right of recovery but 
creates a new cause of action for medical malpractice condi-
tioned on compliance with the statutory terms. 
In conclusion, compliance with § 
8.0_1-581.2 is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Therefore, 
on the basis of these authorities and argUments and on the 
basis of those raised in defendants prior memorandum, 
defendants respectfully request the court to sustain their 
plea of the Statute of Limitations. 
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susan A. Waddell 
George w. Wooten 
FOX, WOOTEN & HART 
P. o. Box 12247 
Roanoke, Virginia 24024-2247 
(703) 343-2451 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Susan A. Waddell/George w. Wooten, hereby certify 
that a true and correct copy of the foreg~ing was mailed to 
Richard Cranwell, Cranwell, Flora & Moore, P. 0. Box 91, 
Roanoke, Virginia, 24002, this \~ day of September, 
1986. 
..~>., i .\~.~ 
Susan A. Waddell 
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RO_..!'IOKE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
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S_..LEM. VIRGINIA 24153 
703' 387-6081 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
c. Richard Cranwell, Esq. 
P. o. Box 91 
Roanoke, VA 24002 
Susan w. Spangler, Esq. 
P. o. Box 12247 
Roanoke, VA 24024 
May 18, 1987 
Dear Mr. Cranwell and Mrs. Spangler: 
Re: Morrison v. Bestler 
Roanoke County Case No. CL84850160 
CIRCUIT COURT OF I'HE COVNTY OF ROANOKE 
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SALEM 
I have reviewed the files involved in this case, the 
pleadings, the memorandums and the arguments of counsel at a 
hearing on May 15, 1987. I am of the opinion that the 
defendant's plea to the statute of limitations should be 
sustained and this case dismissed. 
On March 9, 1984, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment (File No. CL84000087) in the Circuit Court of Roanoke 
County asking for damages for alleged medical malpractice which 
occurred on March 10, 1982. At the time this suit was filed, 
notice of claim had not been given to the health care providers 
as was required by va. Code§ 8.01-581.2 (1984). On the 
following day, Saturday, March 10, 1984, the claimant delivered 
her notice of claim to the health care provider. Service of 
process on the defendant in the Circuit Court case was 
accomplished on March 13, 1984. on March 22, 1984., the defendant 
flled a demurrer and a motion to dismiss upon the grounds that 
Va. Code § 8.01-581.2 (1984) prohibited the filing of an action 
1. Unless the claimant notifies the health care 
provider in writing by registered or certified mail prior to the 
commencing of the action, and 
2. No action shall be brought within 90 days of the 
notification of the claimant. 
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Neither party requested a hearing on the defendant's demurrer and 
motion to dismiss until November 2, 1984. Neither party 
requested a medical malpractice review panel; and on November 13, 
1984, the plaintiff moved for a nonsuit pursuant to va. Code 
§ 8.01-380 (1984). On November 16, the Court entere~an order of 
nonsuit which discontinued the case. This was the first and only 
nonsuit of this cause of action and pursuant to va. Code 
§ 8.01-380 (1984) was a matter of right of the plaintiff. 
On November 16, 1984, plaintiff filed her second motion 
for judgment in the Circuit Court of Roanoke County Case 
No. CL84850160. Service of process was on November 26, 1984, and 
the defendants filed a plea to the statute of limitations on 
November 21, 1984. 
Va. Code § 8.01-581.2 (1984) prohibited the filing of 
suit within 90 days of the notice of claim or before June 9, 
1984. Pu.rsuant to Va. Code § 8. 01-581.9 ( 1984), the notice of 
claim tolled the statute of limitations for a period of 120 days 
from March 10, 1984, which was a period ending July 8, 1984. The 
60-day provision is inapplicable because neither side had asked 
for a medical·review panel. 
Thus, the instant suit was not timely filed unless the 
cause-of action was saved by Va. Code§ 8.01-229 E 3 (1984) 
"If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit 
as prescribed in § 8.01-380, the statute of 
limitations with respect to such action shall 
be tolled by the commencement of the 
nonsuited action, and the plaintiff may 
recommence his action within six months from 
the date he suffers such nonsuit, or within 
the original period of limitation, whichever 
period is longer. This tolling provision 
shall apply irrespective of whether the 
action is originally filed in a federal or 
a state court and recommenced in any other 
court." 
The plaintiff in essence says.that.she has timely filed 
because the second motion for judgment was filed wit~in three 
days of her nonsuit of the first action. Defendant on the other 
hand contends that the second motion for judgment is barred 
because Va. Code § 8.01-581.9 (1984) is controlling and a "valid 
suit" wasnot filed on or before July 8, 1984, the first suit 
having been absolutely prohibited by Va. Code § 8.01-581.2 
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(1984), Baker v. Zirkle, 226 Va. 7 (1983), and Dye v. Staley, 
226 va. 15 (1983). I am of the opinion that it is clear from the 
statutory provisions and Baker that the filing of the first 
action was prohibited until June 9, 1984. Nevertheless, the 
statute of limitations during that period was extended by 
120 days, and suit could have been filed between June 9, 1984, 
and July 8, 1984. Even taking a best scenario for the plaintiff 
and tacking the 120-day tolling or interruption period onto the 
initial 90 days, the filing of the second suit still would not 
have been timely. 
I am of the op~n~on that the voluntary nonsuit statute is not applicable to an action which is prohibited in the first 
place. I agree with the plaintiff that Va. Code § 17-123 (1982) 
gives Circuit Courts of the Commonwealth subject matter 
jurisdiction over medical malpractice cases. However, as to the 
plaintiff's case in this particular instance, but because of the 
statutory provision against the filing of suit under Va. Code 
§ 8.01-581.2 (1984), the Court had potential jurisdiction only. 
For there to have been "active jurisdiction," a certain condition 
of fact must have been met, i.e., that 90 days had elapsed since 
the notification of claim and no request for a medical 
malpractice panel had been made. Thus, this Court did not have 
actual active jurisdiction over the first case, and the 
plaintiff's filing of that suit was null and void. 
Farant Invest. Corp. v. Francis, 138 Va. 417, 427 (1924). 
Plaintiff could have dismissed the first suit and 
timely filed after the 90-day period and within the tolling 
provision of Va. Code§ 8.01-581.9 (1984). Plaintiff .should not 
be entitled to-unilaterally extend the running of the statute of 
limitations by the use of the nonsuit statute in conjunction with 
its companion six-month tolling of the statute (Va. Code 
§ 8.01-229 E 3 (1984)) when the filing of the first case was 
absolutely prohibited in the first instance. 
Plaintiff has raised the issue as to whether the Court 
had jurisdiction to enter a nonsuit order if it lacked 
.jurisdiction over the case in the first instance. Nash v. Jewell, 
227 Va. 230 (1984), makes it clear that the plaintiff has an 
ab~olute right to one nonsuit. The election is· his, and neither 
the trial court nor·opposing counsel can prevent him from doing 
so. However, the court acts by orders and. decrees, and there is 
no termination of litigation until the court enters an 
appropriate order. The court has the authority to terminate the 
litigation, even if it does not have jurisdiction, so long as the 
termination serves to discontinue the case only and is not a 
determination of the merits. 
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For these reasons I am of the op~n~on that 
Chapter 21.1, Medical Malpractice, and the prohibition from 
filing suit under Va. Code § 8.01-581.2 (1984) and the tolling 
provisions of va. Code § 8.01-581.9 (1984) are controlling. If 
the nonsuit statute va. Code § 8.01-380 (1984) and the tolling 
provision of Va .• Code § 8.01-229 E 3 (1984) were to control, then 
the provisions-of the Medical Malpractice Act would have no 
meaning. 
Counsel for defendant may prepare an appropriate order 
reserving unto the plaintiff her objections upon the grounds 
stated in her memorandum. 
Very truly yours, 
Kenneth E. Trabue 
rrs 
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TELEPHONE (703) 344-1000 
July 16, 1987 
The Honorable Kenneth E. Trabue, Judge 
Roanoke County Circuit Court 
P. o. Box 
Salem, Va 24153 
Dear Judge Trabue: 
Re: Letter Memorandum 
Dorothy T. Morrison 
v. 
James Michael Bestler, M.D., et al 
Law No. CL8~850160 
I...AW O,.,.ICES: 
Ill VIRGINIA AVENUE 
VINTON, VIRGINIA 2-4179 
3130 CHAPARRAL. ORIVE, 5.W. 
ROANOKE, VIRGINIA 2•018 
TELEPHONE (703 I 989-10!51 
TI!:LECOPIItR NUMBER 
(7031 3..W•7073 
Pursuant to my various phone conversations with you 
and Susan Spangler, I am submitting this letter as additional 
authority in support of our request to over rule the 
Defendants' statute of limitation plea. 
I reference your May 18, 1987 opinion letter wherein 
you rule that the Plaintiff's the first suit was absolutely 
prohibited by Virginia Code § 8.01-581.2 (1984), Baker v. 
Zir.kle, 226 Va. 7 (1983), and Dye v. Staley, 226 va. 15 
(l983). ~hus the statute of limitations had expired when the 
second suit was filed. You ruled the first suit was a nullity 
because of the prohibition in § 8. 01.581.2. In essence your 
ruling is that the Court was without jurisdiction when the 
first suit was filed within the statute of limitations period 
and thus the filing was a nullity. I would ask the Cou~t 
specifically to look at § 8.01-581.2 of the malpractice 
statutes and compare the language therein with § 8.01-222 with 
respect to the prerequisite to maintain an action against 
cities and towns in the Commonwealth. 
The initial language is strikingly simi·lar ·in those . 
two statutes. They language is as follows: 
MALPRACTICE ST~TUTE: 
8. 01-581.2 - Notice of Claim for medical 
malpract~ce required; request for review 
bymedical malpractice panel; rescission of 
request; determination on request. 
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No action may be brought for malpractice 
against a health care provider unless the 
claimant notifies such health care provider 
.1.n wr.1. t.J.ng, by registered certified mail 
prior to commencement of the act •••• 
(emphasis added) 
SUITS AGAINST CITIES AND TOWNS 
§ 8.01-222 - Notice to be iven cities and 
No action shall be maintained against any 
city or town for injury to any person or 
property or for wrongful death alleged to 
have been sustained by reason of negligence 
of the city or town or any officer, agent 
or employee thereof unless a written 
statement by the compla.J.nant, h.J.s agent, 
attorney or representative of the nature of 
the claim and time and place at which the 
injury is alleged to have occurred or has 
been received shall have been filed with 
the city attorney or town attorney or with 
the mayor or chief executive officer after 
such cause of action shall have accrued •••• 
(emphasis added) 
The only other place that I find a similar provision 
in law is in § 15.1-945.7 of the Code dealing with the prior 
review by the Commission on Local Government before the 
commencement of annexation of action. It should be noted that 
in § 8.01-222 and § 8.0l-581.2 that tne statute says that no 
action may be maintained or brought respective. In neither 
case does it say no action shall be filed with the court. 
However, in § 15.1-94 5. 7 of the Code the language does 
prohibit any local government, person or persons from "filing 
any action" in any court in Virginia to annex territory until 
it has first notified the Commission on Local Government and 
gone through that review process. This may be the plain 
language the Supreme Court was speaking of in City of South 
Norfolk v. Dail, 185 va. 495 (1948) the legislature should use 
to-d.J.vest the courts of jurisdiction. 
If we look at the three statutes, the strik~ng 
similarity of § 8.01-222 to § 8.01-581.2 leads to the 
inevitable conclusion that the construction the Supreme Court 
places on §.8.01-222 is the construction that it would also 
place on § 8.01-581.2 of the malpractice statute. I refer you 
specifically to the City of South Norfolk v Dail, 187 Va. 495 
(1948) wherein the Supreme Court said in reversing its prior 
holding that notice was jurisdictional and a prerequisite to 
instituting any court action under·§ 8.01-222: 
5~ 
Undoubtedly the law in Virginia at this 
time is that notice ~s a matter of 
jurisdiction and a failure to allege it is 
fatal to any action against the city based 
on negligence. 
After mature consideration we have reached 
the conclusion that this hold~ng is harsh 
and unreasonable, and should be modified. 
As the provis~ons have been heretofore 
construed, the failure to give the notice 
constitutes a trap for the unwary. We do 
not think the allegation ought to be a 
jurisdictional essential nor do we think 
our prior dec i s ions on this point, so 
holding, are justified. Therefore, this 
court should not continue to perpetuate 
what it now regards as error. 
[4, 5] A fair interpretation of the statute 
and the various charters of the cities does 
not compel us to make the notice a 
jurisdictional essential. If the General 
Assembly had so intended, .1.t would have 
used plain language for that purpose. 
While the provisions of the statute and the 
charters in this regard are mandatory and a 
compliance with them is necessary, they 
should not be regarded as jurisdictional. 
The failure to make the allegation of 
notice should be taken advantage of by the 
city as a matter of defense to the action. 
It should not be held to be a complete bar 
to the institution of the action, nor a 
condit~on precedent to the r.1.ght to 
institute it. In reality, the failure to 
give ~ t wi th~n the prescribed time is in 
effect and practical operation no more than 
conferring· upon the city a preferential 
benefit of a 60-day statute of limitation. 
[6] We therefore hold, in the light of what 
we now regard as the better reason, that 
the requirement is . not jurisdictionalt.O' 
the institution of an. action against a 
cit~, and that our former decisions so 
hold.1.ng should be disapproved and modified 
to that extent ••••• The record here shows no 
attempt at compliance with the mandatory 
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provisions of the statute ••• but the 
question of the failure to _give the notice 
was raised for the first time in this court 
which under Rule 22 comes too late. 
Id. at 503, 504 (emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court in Daniel v. City of Richmond, 199 
va. 490 (1957) also acknowledges that the notice requirement 
was not jurisdictional and the failure to give such notice 
should be raised by a defendant like any other non-
jurisdictional defense in an action. I would suggest to the 
Court that it is clear from the language in City of South 
Norfolk v. Dail at 503 that failure of notice is not a 
complete bar to-the institution of an action, nor a condition 
precedent to the right to institute an action. It is clear 
that the Supreme Court will construe the provisions found in 
§8.01-581. 2 of the malpractice act with respect to prior 
notice, as not operative to deny the court justification over 
the Plaintiff's first malpractice suit, when read in 
conjunction with City of South Norfolk case. 
I would agree with the Court that during the ninety 
(90) day cooling off period provided in § 8.02-581.2 the 
Defendant had the absolute right under the statute to have 
the first suit dismissed. However, when that ninety (90) day 
period expired that right also expired. Failure to comply 
with the notice provisions of § 8.02-581.2 is an affirmative 
defense like any other non-jurisdictional defense and should 
have been raised and disposed of within ninety (90) days. To 
rule otherwise is to place form above substance. The 
Defendant did not request a medical malpractice review panel, 
and "but for" the lack of compliance with all the procedural 
niceties we would be .right where we· are today with a suit 
pending without any review by a malpractice panel. 
I suggest to the Court that the best authority for 
this Court to rely upon in construing the provisions of 
§ 8. 01-581.2 in the Malpractice Act is City of South Norfolk 
v. Dail and its holding that prior notice requirements for 
ma~nta~ning an action found in § 8.01-222 of the Code against 
municipality is not a prerequisite to institute a suit but, 
rather an affirmative defense that must be raised like any 
other non-jurisdictional defense. I submit to the Court that 
the first action filed by the Plaintiff prior to the 
expiration of the two year statute of limitation was 
appropriately filed and the nonsuit taken relates back to that 
date and the second suit was therefore timely filed. It may 
well have been subject to dismissed during·the ninety (90) day 
cooling off period provided by statute. If however, the 
General Assembly had intended the requirements to be 
jurisdictional it would have used· plain language for that 
purpose. City of South Norfolk v. Dail, supra. 
We would further submit that the entire prov1s1ons of 
Chapter 21. 1 of Title 8. 01 of the Virginia Code, commonly 
referred to as the Malpractice Act are unconstitutional 
because they violate Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution 
vesting all judicial power in the Supreme Court and Circuit 
Courts of the Commonwealth. It is also unconstitutional 
because it violates the provisions of Article IV, Section 14 
which prohibits local, special, and private laws regulating 
the practice in, or the jurisdiction of, or changing the rules 
of evidence of any judicial proceeding or inquiry before the 
courts or other· tribunal, or providing or changing the method 
of collecting debts and enforcing judgments. It is unconsti-
tutional in that it violates Article IV, Section 15 of the 
Virginia Constitution because it exempts individuals from the 
operation of general law and suspends the operation of general 
laws for the benefit of private associations, corporations and 
individuals in the Commonwealth in the field of practice of 
health care. It is unconstitutional because it limits the 
fact finding ability of a jury guaranteed under the VII 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution. It is also in 
violation of the equal protection, and due process clauses of 
the United States Constitution. 
Since the entire Malpractice Act is unconstitutional, 
it is respectfully submitted that it is not applicable to the 
suit filed by the Plaintiff against the Defendant within the 
two year statute of limitation provided by S 8.01-243 of the 
Code. 
For the reasons set forth in this letter, I 
respectfully request that the Court reconsider its prior 
ruling, set a schedule for discovery and upon completion of 
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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
c. Richard Cranwell, Esq. 
P. o. Box 91 
Roanoke, VA 24002 
Dear Dick: 
July 21, 1987 
Re: Morrison v. Bestler 
Roanoke County Case No. CL84850160 
CIR.CUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF ROANOKE 
CIRCUIT COUR.T OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
CIR.CUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SALEM 
Thank you for your letter of July 16, 1987. As soon as 
susan Spangler has had an opportunity to respond to your letter 
of July 16, 1987, I will address the questions which you have 
raised. I suggest that 21 days be allowed; but if Susan ne~ds 
longer, she should advise the-court of whatever date she needs. 
Very truly yours, 
Kenneth E. Trabue 
rrs 
cc: Susan w. Spangler, Esq. 
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August 6, 1987 
The Honorable Kenneth E. Trabue, Judge 
Roanoke County Circuit Court 
305 East Main Street 
Salem, Virginia 24153 
Re: Dorothy T. Morrison 
v. 
James Michael Bestler, M.D., et al. 
Law No. CL84850160 
Dear Judge Trabue: 
CHARLES E. MILLS,M,OF' COUNSEL 
WILLIAM E. VALENTINE, OF COUNSEL 
This letter is filed in response to the letter memoran-
dum filed by the plaintiff on or about July 16, 1987. 
Plaintiff raises for the first time in that letter the 
issue of whether the language in § 8.01-581.2 (1984) is 
mandatory and jurisdictional. In opposition to the defen-
dant's arguments and authorities that the code section in 
question is mandatory and jurisdictional, the plaintiff 
offers the Virginia Supreme Court's construction of current 
code § 8.01-222, which requires that notice be given to 
cities and towns of negligence claims within six months of 
the date that the cause of action accrues. 
As noted by the plaintiff, the applicable portion of 
§ 8.01--581.2 provides as follows: 
No action may be brought for malpractice against a 
health care provider unless the claimant notifies such 
health care provider in writing. (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court of Virginia has described the differ-
ence between a mandatory provision and a directory provision 
in the case of Ladd v. Lamb, 195 Va. 1031, S.E.2d 756 
(1954), as follows: 
A mandatory provision in a statute is one the _ 
· omission to follow which renders the proceeding to 
which it relates illegal and void, while a direc-
tory provision is one the observance of which is· 
not necessary to the validity of the proceed-
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Thus, generally speaking, the Supreme Court has indicated 
that a statute that is mandatory is also jurisdictional. 
There are exceptions to the general rule that mandatory 
language in a statute is jurisdictional. Va. Code Ann. 
§ 8.01-235 states that a plea to the statute of lim.i.tations 
can only be raised as an affirmative defense specifically 
set forth in a responsive pleading. The statute goes on to 
state as follows: "No statutory limitation period shall 
have jurisdictional effect." Under prior law a statute of 
limitation was considered jurisdictional if it created a new 
right. 
In the case relied upon by the plaintiff, City of South 
Norfolk v. Dail, 187 va. 495, 47 S.E.2d 405 (1948), the 
issue before the Supreme Court was whether former Code 
§ 6043 (A) ( cur.rent Code § 8. 01-222) was both mandatory and 
jurisdictional. The statute at that time provided that 
·notice must be given to a municipal authority within 60 days 
of the accrual of a negligence cause of action, as opposed 
to the 6-month time period allowed under the current law. 
The court concluded that the provision in question was a 
limitation on the action and not a condition precedent to 
the. lawsuit. Therefore, the court treated the 60-day notice 
requirement as a statute of limitation and the allegation of 
notice was found not jurisdictional. 
Unlike qurrent Code § 8.01-222, compliance with 
§ 8.01-581.2 is a condition precedent to the institution of 
the action. Section 8.01-222 sets forth a time period in 
which notice of claim must be given. In contrast, the 
applicable language of § 8.01-581.2 requires only that 
notice of malpractice claim be given prior to the institu-
tion of the medical malpractice lawsuit. It is also impor-
tant to note that § 8.01-222 prohibits an action from being 
maintained without notice, while § 8.01-581.2 prohibits the 
action from being brought. The language in § 8.01-581.2 
creates a mandatory and jurisdictional requirement that is a 
condition precedent to institutfon of the action for mal-
practice. 
This construction is supported by the language of the 
Supreme Court in Baker v. Zirkle, 226 va. 7 307 S.E.2d 234 
(1983): 
As a result of Code § 8.01-581.2, a medical 
malpractice claimant is absolutely forbidden from 
filing an action until ninety days after notifica-
tion to the ·health care provider •••• (emphasis 
added). 
Even stronger language is found in the recent decision 
of the Supreme Court in Horn, Administratrix v. Abernathy, 2 
V.L.R. 1793 (1986). In that malpractice case the Supreme 
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court stated: "Under Code § 8.01-581.2 (Replacement Volume 
1977), a claimant has no right to bring such an action 
unless he gives the health care provider written notice of 
his claim." 
Thus, the Supreme Court has found that the malpractice 
notice requirement is a condition precedent to the filing of 
the lawsuit and not a statute of limitation. 
Plaintiff, in her brief, refers to language of Va. Code 
Ann. § 15.1-945.7 which prohibits any local governme~or--­
other person from filing any action to annex territory until 
notification has been given to the Commission and all local 
governments. Plaintiff suggests that the language in that 
Code section may be the plain language the Supreme Court was 
speaking of in the City of South Norfolk case that would 
divest the court of jurisdiction. This Court should take 
note that the language in § 8.01-581.2 is similar to the 
language of § 15.1-945.7. The language in§ 15.1-945.7 is 
as follows: "No local government, person or persons of 
Virginia shall file any action in any court of Virgin-
ia ••• without first notifying the Commission and all local 
governments •••• " In saying that no action may be brought 
for malpractice, the legislature is saying that no action 
may be filed. In contrast, the language of § 8.01-222, that 
no action shall be maintained without notice, has a totally 
different connotation. 
The plaintiff's second argument is that compliance with 
§ 8.01-581.2 is an affirmative defense that should be raised 
and disposed of within ninety days. This is not so but in 
any event the plaintiff in this case was put on notice of 
his mistake before the expiration of the applicable statute 
of limitations period. 
Notice of claim was given in this matter on March 10, 
1984, as noted by the Court. on March 22, 1984, these 
defendants filed a demurrer and a motion to dismiss upon the 
grounds that va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.2 (1984) prohibited 
the filing of the-acti~ When that demurrer was filed, the 
plaintiff could have corrected her mistake by nonsuiting the 
first lawsuit and refiling between June 9, 1984, and July 8, 
1984. ·The defendant's demurrer was explicit in asserting 
the violation of the statute. All the plaintiff had to do 
was read the statute and comply with its provisions. · This 
the plaintiff failed to do. 
_As noted by the Supreme- Court in Horn v. Abernathy, 
supra: 
The act itself gave the plaintiff fair notice 
affecting the right to file suit. 
In the Horn case, the plaintiff was held to have missed 
the statute of limitations because he did not file his suit 
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within the 30-day corridor permitted on the facts of that 
case through the application of § 8.01-581.2 and 
§ 8.01-581.9. Thus, to that extent, the plaintiff's errors 
in the Horn case are similar to those of the plaintiff in 
the case at bar. In the Horn case, defendant's counsel was 
aware that the Supreme Court had rejected a purported 
request for a panel proceeding so that the statute of 
limitations was not tolled by the purported request for a 
panel hearing. The plaintiff's counsel was under the 
impression that the statute of limitations was tolled by the 
purported request. Nevertheless, the Court stated that the 
act itself gave the plaintiff fair notice affecting his 
right to file suit. Suit was not filed until after.the 
corridor had closed and the matter was not even pleaded 
until after the statute of limitations period had expired. 
The Supreme Court did not make raising the issue within the 
ninety day "cooling off period" to be a prerequisite to the 
assertion of the defense. 
Plaintiff argues that Chapter 21.1 of Title 8.01 is 
unconstitutional. No court has ruled that § 8.01-581.2 is 
unconstitutional, however. The notice provisions of the act 
have been specifically upheld in the Horn decision, where 
the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the 
notice issue as follows: 
A plaintiff bears the burden of filing suit within 
the time limit prescribed by law, and we find no 
constitutional infirmity in the Medical Malprac-
tice Act as applied to the facts of this case. 
Further, the Fourth Circuit has upheld the constitu-
tionality of the notice requirement in the case of D'Antonio 
v. Northhampton Accomac Hospital, 628 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 
1980). 
For the reasons set forth in this letter, the defen-
dants, Dr. J. Michael Bestler and J. Michael Bestler, M.D., 
Inc., request this Court to reaffirm its prior ruling and to 
enter final judgment in the above-captioned matter. 
Very truly yours, 
,-
Susan Waddell Spangler. -
SWS/el 
cc: Richard c .. Cranwell, Esquire 
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COMMONWEALTH OF' VIRGINIA 
October 20, 1987 
c. Richard Cranwell, Esq. 
P. o. Box 91 
Roanoke, VA 24002 
susan w. Spangler, Esq. 
P. o. Box 12247 
Roanoke, VA 24024-2247 
Dear Dick and Susan: 
Re: Morrison v. Bestler, et al. 
Roanoke County Case No. CL84850160 
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COI'~TY OF ROANOKE 
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE C:T'I' C'r 1\0,...NOKE 
CIR.C:UIT COURT OF THE CIT'I' OF ~ALEM 
Upon ·review of the supplemental authorities and 
argument which·each has presented, I am satisfied that the 
General Assembly intended that there be a difference between the 
meaning "no action may be brought for.malpractice" under Va. Code 
§ 8.01-581.2 (1984) and "no action shall be maintained against 
any city or town" under Va. Code§ 8.01-222 (1984). The opinion 
which I expressed in my letter to counsel of May 18, 1987, shall 
stand. Mrs. Spangler may present a final order in accordance 
with that opinion reserving unto the plaintiff all objections for 
which grounds were stated in her memorandums. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Very truly yours, · 




IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF ROANOKE 
DOROTHY T. MORRISON, 
Plaintiff 
JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D. 
and JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, 
M.D., INC., d/b/a COSMETIC 














On Friday, May 15, 1987, the defendants, James Michael 
Bestler and James Michael Bestler, M.D., Inc., by counsel, 
were heard on their plea of the statute of limitations. The 
plaintiff, by counsel, was present at the hearing. After 
reviewing the file involved in the case, the pleadings, the 
memoranda of counsel and considering argument of counsel, 
this Court is of the opinion that Chapter 21.1, Medical 
Malpractice, the prohibition stated in va. Code Ann. § 
8.01-581.2 (1984) and the tolling· provisions of va. Code 
Ann. § 8.01-581.9 are controlling. 
Plaintiff argued at the above hearing that the first 
cause of action contained in Count I of the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Judgment based on alleged misrepresentation was 
outside the purview of the Medical Malpractice Act. 
~owever, this Court is of the opinion that all Counts of the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment allege· claims for medical 
malpractice within the purview of the Medical Malpractice 
Act (Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.1 et seq.). Therefore, for 
the ·reasons stated in the letter opinion of the Court dated 
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May 18, 1987, and in the subsequent letter opinion of the 
Court dated October 20, 1987, which are made a part of this 
Order and incorporated herein by reference, the Court finds 
that the defendants' plea of the statute of limitations is 
well taken. 
It is accordingly ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the 
defendants' plea of the statute of limitations be, and the 
same hereby is, sustained and this action is dismissed with 
prejudice. 
The Clerk is directed to remove this case from the 
docket and to certify copies of this Order to all counsel of 
record. 
ENTER this ~day of November, 1987. 
w~ ASK FOR THIS: 
s ~. ~~_,_ ~,_ __ ,_ 
Counsel for James M~chiil 
Bestler, M.D. and James 
Michael Bestler, M.D., Inc., 
d/b/a Cosmetic Surgery of Virginia 
SEEN AND OBJECTED TO: 
7 Juage 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF ROANOKE 
DOROTHY T. MORRISON, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D. 
and JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, 
M.D., INC., d/b/a COMESTIC 




NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Law No. CL84850160 
The Plaintiff, Dorothy T. Morrison, gives notice of 
appeal from the Order of this Court entered November 17, 1987, 
sustaining the Defendants' plea of the statute of limitations 
in the above cause and dismissing the Plaintiff's action with 
prejudice. 
The Plaintiff will not file a transcript of the 
proceedings, testimony and other incidents of the case, but 
will file a statement of facts, testimony and other incidents 
of the case. 
DOROTHY T. MORRISON 
.~ 
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c. Richard Cranwell, Esquire 
Patrick s. Shiel, Esquire 
CRANWELL, FLORA & MOORE 
P. o. Box 11804 
Roanoke, Virginia 24022-1804 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Appeal, was mailed or delivered to Susan 
Spangler, Esquire of Fox, Wooten & Hart, Counsel for the 
Defendants, P. o. Box 12247, Roanoke, Virginia 24024-2247, 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF ROANOKE 
DOROTHY T. MORRISON, ) 
) 




JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D. ) 
) 
and ) Law No. CL84-850160 
) 
JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D., INC., ) 




On the 22nd day of January, 1988, came the parties to 
this action, by counsel, to be heard on plaintiff's proposed 
Statement of Pertinent Facts and Relevant Proceedings filed 
on January 4, 1988, and on defendants' Notice of Objection 
to the same, pursuant to Rule S:ll(d) of the Rules of the 
Supreme Court of Virginia. 
After considering argument of counsel, it appears to 
the Court that any statement of facts or relevant. pro~~gs 
is unnecessary because no transcri-p.t._or evidence-L.bmitted 
in this case and, therefore, a statement of pertinent facts 
and relevant proceedings is neither appropriate or necessary 
for the determination of the issues in this case. 
Therefore, it is ADJUDGED and ORDERED t~at the Plaintiff's 
proposed Statement of Facts and Relevant Proceedings is not 
relevant or appropriate to these proceedings and the Court 
will not sign that proposed Statement. 
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The parties have stipulated that the chronology set 
forth in the Court's Memorandum Opinion is accurate, except 
that it is noted that service was first obtained in this 
action on the individual defendant, James Michael Bestler, 
M.D., on November 21, 1984, and on the corporate defendant 
on November 26, 1984. 
It appearing further to the Court that the parties had 
previously stipulated that the contents of a previously-
filed case of the same style, CL84-00087, be made a part of 
this action, CL84850160, the Court hereby ORDERS the Clerk 
to certify File No. CL84-00087 as part of the record in this 
case. 
The Clerk is directed to certify copies of this Order 
to counsel of record. 
ENTER this _JJ_ day of £~ 1988. 
Seen and Agreed To: 
Seen and Agreed To in Part 





PROOF OF SERVICI 
:Yirginia: 
IN THE CIRCUIT CouRT oF THE CouNTY OF RoANOKE 
DOROTHY T, MORRISON 
VI. 
JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D. ET AL 
1001 Mulberry Road 
Martinsville, Virginia 24112 
and 
Philip G. Gardner, ·Registered Agent 
10 North Bridge Street 
Martinsville, Virginia 24112 
CL840087 LAW NO .................... . 
~~«;!IT WIElD) 
MAR 13 1984 
MAYNARD H. GILLEY, SHERIFF 
Returns shall be made hereon, showing service of Notice issued .......... ~~?:.Sh ... ~~---····• 19 .... ~~. 
with copy of Motion for.Judsment.Mcrrctr··l:2··········filed ............................ , 19 -~-~--• attached: 
Executed on the ..... !.f. day of ... l.?:!~~~:i.l. ................. , 19.(.;{. in the A. of 1It::.!~. 
~~~~-B.t:.y7.L.~if.:::t.:~.-~;~.:2~~~:~ 
..........................................•............................................................................................ m person. 
h Jl ;:· ·'&. ~-/~ 
....... !~ ....... :. .. ~ ... ~-#.7-······l:l:.-:~ ................... ::: .............. . 
SHERIFF, em 'Ni¥ .OF RO' t'Stee-~ VA. 
BY .. €..t:4.:.~7C:7:~.~ .............. DEPUTY SHERIFF. 
(Use the space below if a diHerent form of return is necestary) 
. --
Returned and filed the .................... ~ of ..•... ·-·----t?;··NAI .. 1.4 .. ~ ....... 19 ........ . 
·······?i··········!:':,j·;!~~:.~ .. /1 ... ~~/. 7~---··• CLERK. 
~ :C.· · / JL.L.· BY:~.L ~~.S:L.1.. ; ..... DEPUTY CLERK. 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
tJirginia: 
IN THE CIRCUIT CoURT OF THE COUNTY OF ROANOKE 
DOROTHY T, MORRISON 
VI. 
JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D. ET AL 
1001 Mulberry Road 
Martinsville, Virginia 24112 
and 
Philip G. Gardner, Registered Agent 
10 North Bridge Street 
~artinsvil1e, Virginia 24112 
CL840087 
LAW NO .................... . 
MAYNARD H. GillEY, SHERIFF. 
Heturns shall be made hereon, showing service of Notice issued .......... ~~:r:.<?.~---~~- ....• 19 ... -~~. 
with copy of Motion for judgment.Mcrrctt···]:2 ...... ~ .. .filed............................. 19 .. ~.~ ..• attached: 
· ~ . t ,t;J . -~ .J11tn'tlo 
Executed on the ... /.:~~. ... day of .... m~.................. 19 .... :r ... m the ~ of Rs k.e. 
~'.i.rgi~i:: .. ~~ -~~-~.:Y~l~d~;.~~---:~~ 
..............................•.................................•..................•............................................... In person. 
~:!~;."-~~-~~·:·~::::~£, ... 
BY ••• I/.f'//~~-.... . ..... DEPUTY SHERIFF. 
(Use the spo~cf' below if 1 different form of retvrn is nece11ary) 
Returned and filed the ...................... day of .................. .-.; ..... ; ........................................• 19 ........ . 
~o ~-~· ( ...... 7J.f.1..:..~:;t .. ;A--~~--···· ......... CLERK. 





IN T'dE CIRCUIT COUR'l' FOR TP..E COL~IT'Y OF RCAKO¥E 
OOROTH'i T. t-DRRISON 
Plaintiff 
"J. 
J~ MICHAEL BEST"'.uER, M.D. 
Se.l'Ve: 1001 Mulberrj Road 
Martinsville, VA 24112 
and 
-
J. MICHAEL BESTLER I MD. I INC. 
toing Business .~ 
COSt~IC SURGERY OF VIRGINIA, 
De.fe."ldants 
Serve: Pr..i.lip G. Gard"'ler, 
Registered Agent 
10 North Bridge Street 
Martinsville, VA 24114 
l-1Cfi'ION FOR 
JL"DGa--r 
. The Plaintif::, Ibrothy T. ~brrison, moves the Court ::or 
; Judgrrent against the Defenda.1t.s, Janes ~..ic!:ael Bestler, M.D. and 
J. Michael Bestler, M.D. , Inc. , doing bi.:.siness l.mCe!" the trade r.a.rr.e 
of Cosrretic Surgery of Virginia, and in support thereof, respect~ully 
represents as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plai."'ltiff is a resident of t.~e area of Blue Riege, 
County of BotetolZt, State of Virginia: 
2. Defe.nda.."1t, Janes N. Bestle:r 1 M.D. , is a resident of the 
CRANWELL. FLORA City of Martinsville, State of Virginia; 
& MOORE, P. C. 
VINTON, VIRGINIA 3. Defer.dal"lt, J. t'.d.c.,ael Beste!:' I ~1. D. I Inc. I coing busi::ess as 
Cos~mtic Surgery of Virginia. , is a Virgi:~ia Corporation wi ~~ offices in 
the Cou.'"lty of Poanoke and the City of !-1art.:..nsville; 
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4. At all tirres me.r.tioned herein, the Defenda'lt, Ja""nes 
l-1ichael Bestler, M.D. and J. Michael Bestler, M.D., Inc., was ar:C. 
still is a physica."l and surgeon duly licensed u.'lder the ~aws cf t,."'lis 
State with offices at Professional Park, Suite 102, 4502 Starkey Road, 
in the Ccur.ty of Roanoke, a'ld ~dical Center, Suite 204, 102 Hospital D:-., 
in t.l1e City of ~.artinsville; Defendant held himself out to the general 
public, ar~d partic~arly to ~~e Plaintiff as a surgeon, skilled i~ the 
field of cosmetic surgery, including· r.eck and face lift surgery, a'"'ld as 
such, able to treat Plaintiff with skill for the ailment he~ein ~1tioned. 
5. Prior to and on March 10, 1982, Plaintiff's neck had 
sagging redundar,t skin. On Februart 16, 1982, Plaintiff believed ~;at 
Defendant was a surgeon skilled in t.~e art of such professicn and in 
such belief consulted Defaidant. Defenda'lt represented to Plaintiff t,at 
by rerroving and .. lifting the skin on her neck., the neck would be sm:x::>thed 
and tighte:-~ed. 
6. J?laintif:: believed aforesaid representations anc in such 
belief, t.'-len and t."ler~ employed Defendant to perform said operation. 
7. Thereafter, or. !m'ch 10, 1982, Plaintiff, on Defenda.."lt•s 
advice, en.tere:i Me.rrorial Hospital of l-lartinsville and Henry County, in 
the City of Martinsville to enable Defendant to perfor.r. the neck lift 
surgical procedure. Plaintiff oonsented to be placed under local 
anesthetic and sedation d\.lring said surgical procedure; hO\-:ever, 
Plair:tiff and Defendant agreed orally that during the surgical procedure 
LAW OFFICE 
CRANWELL. FLORA Defendant would not operate on Plaintiff• s face ll4"1der .any ci~CUirsta~ces. 
& MOORE, P.C. 
VINTON, VIRGINIA 
8. On ~.arch 10, 1982, Cefendant, wit.~out Plaintiff's consent, 
inte."ltionally ot=erated on Plaintii::' s face \'Jhile Plaintiff \-Tas under 
anest.~esia. 
9. As a direct and pro:d.'!late result cf Defertda'"lt' s unau~~orized 
operation on Plaintiff, Plainti£: sustained the following injuries: 
facial scarring and disfigurement. By the foregoL~g, the Plai."1tiff suffered 
and continues to suffer extreme ph~lsical pain ar.d suffering a"ld severe 
nervous shock, depression, humiliation and rrental distress, all -:o her damage 
in the sum of $100,000.00. 
10. As a further and direct and proximate resU:.t of Cefe-1dant' s 
actions, Plaintiff will suffer the following special darre.ges: Expe:1ses 
for furt.L,.er surgical care. Pl.a.L""lti.:f does not ~ow the exact arrou.'l'lt of 
.said expenses, and she requests leave of Court to a'l"fald tr1is pleading 
to insert said arrount when ascertained. 
11. Defendant acted ~illfully and maliciously for v.'i:i~~ 
Plaintiff seeks punitive damages of $300,000.00. 
SECOND c;USE OF ACTION 
Plaintiff complains against the Defe:tdants, Jarres :vt. Bestier, 
~1.0. and J. Hichael Bestler, M.D., Inc., a.--:d for a second cause of Action 
says: 
1. Plaintiff incorporates Parag::-aphs one (l) throug::, eleven (11) 
uw oFF1ct of her first cause of Action CL"'ld makes t.~e same a ~t t~ereof. 
CRANWELL, FLORA 
& MOORE, P.C. 2. On February 16, 1982, at Cefendant's off::.ce, Defe."1dant 
VINTCH, VIRGINIA 




& MOORE. P.C. 
VINTOrt, VIRGINIA 
surgical procedure, a neckli!t, and expressly guaranteed ~~t said operat~cn 
would not require an incision of Pla~'"ltiff 1 s face. As oonsideration for 
Defendant • s promises and guaranties and :t;erformance of said operation, 
Plaintiff paid ~'1e Ce:Eencant Seven-Hundred Collars ($700.00) then and 
agreed to pay Seva~-3undred Dollars {$700.00) at a later date. 
3. Therea:ter, on ~larch 10, 19 82, Pl~"1ti::f rel~iing on 
Defenda~t·s representations and guara~ties, entered Ma~rial Hospital 
of Martinsville anC. Henry County in ~~e City of Hart.iru;ville, where 
Defendant attempted to renove the excess skin by said necklift. 
Defen1ant, operating in an ur.skillful and negligent man.."l.er, failed to 
rerrove the excess skin and instead, performed a face-lift on the Plaintiff. 
4. Defendant's actions constituted a breac~ of his express 
guaranty to rerrcve saic excess skin without making an incision into 
lain tiff' s face. 
5. ~ a direct and proxi."M.te result of said breac."l and said 
facelift, Plain tiff sustained the follG.Ying inj ur:..es : facial scarring 
d disfigure:ne..11t. By the foregoing, t.~e Plair.tif! suffered and conti:1ues 
suffer eAtr~e physical pain and suffering and severe ne~AJ~s shock, 
mental dis tress, a!.l tc her damage in the sum 
f $100,000.00. 
5. As a further direct and pro:d.mate result of Defendant' s 
Plai."'ltiff •_,Jill suffer special damages of eh-penses fer furt.~er 
Plaintiff does not kna..; t.,e exact anount cf said expenses 
d she reques t.s leave of Court to arrend the pleadings to insert said 
unt whal"l ascertained. 
LAW OFFICE 
THIF.D c..;usE OF Ac:-:::CN 
Plaintiff cornplai."ls agair1st the Defenda-:ts James .!1. Bestler, H. D. 
and J. ~.ichael Bestler, M.D. , Inc. , a '"ld for a third cause of Action says : 
1. P~aintiff incorr:orates Paragraphs one (1) t~ough e~even (11) 
of her first cause of Action and Paragraphs one (1) through six (6) of 
her serond Cause of Action, against the De:endants James M. Bestler, M.D. 
a"ld J. ~1ic.~el Bestler, !-1. D. , Inc. , and makes the same a part hereof. 
2. On Marc.~ 10, 1982, ~~e Defendant undertook as a physician and 
surgeon to perfo:m an necklift and facelift on Pl~'ltiff. 
3. Defendant was negligent in his treatment of Plai..""ltiff in 
that he failed to exercise t:e degree of skill and care, or to possess t.~e 
degree of kncwledge, ordinarily exercisec or possessed in sin'ilar cases 
by other surgeons, taking L'Tto account the existing ~tate of knowledge and 
practice in the profession. Defendant was negligent in tha-c he performed 
-
saie operation in such a rrarner that the Plaintiff•s face on ~~e right 
side is pulled too tight so that 1'-..er right eye pulls down and h~ eyelid 
droops; that the right side of Defendant • s rrot:.tl: at her lip sags or 
droops; that t.l-te right ear stands out further then her left ear; that 
the left ~~d right sides of P~aintiff's face were pulled out of symmetry; 
that the neck lift was not ~formed; t"lat t.~e pre-auricular incision did 
not closely follow the sulcus in fro!'lt of t..l-te ears. T:'1e De:endant operated 
on t.~e Plaintiff without first cor..sulting her rredical chart. 
4. As a proxL"tlate rescl t of the I:efendant • s negligence P2.aintiff 
CRANWELL, FLORA received the following injuries: facial scarring and disfigurement.. By 
& MOORE, P.C. 
VINTON, VIRGINIA the forego.L"lg, t..~e Plaintiff suffered. and continues to suffer exr-re.TTe physical 
LAW OFFICE 
CRANWELL, FLQR,\ 
& MOORE, P.C. 
VINTON, VIRGINIA 
pain and suffering, and severe ner ... raus shock, depression, h'..:mi.liaticn a"'li 
m:mtal distress, all to her damage in the sum cf $100,000. 00. 
5. P...s a further direct and proxi.rrate res,Ut of Cefe.l'ldar.t' s 
actior~, Plaintif! wi~l suffer special d~ages of ex;ense for fu=ther 
surgical care. P:a:Jltiff does not knov1 t.'1e exact a.TtOunt of said 
expenses, and she reg..:ests leave of Court to arr.enc t..'1is pleading to 
insert said am:n.:nt when ascertained. 
wt:.EREFCRE, the Plaintiff prays judgment aga:.."'lst the Cefenda11ts, 
Dr. Jarres M. Bestler, M.D. and J. Michael Bestler, M.D., Inc., as fol!ows:. 
1. ~"'leral damages of $300,000.00; 
2. All reasonable medical, hospital and nursing e~"1Ses, 
exact anount of whic."1 is urJmawn to tl:e Plaintiff at t~is time; a."'ld 
leave of Court will be asked to insert the true arount when tl:e sa~ 
has been ascertai~ed; 
3. Punitive danages o:E $300 ,ooo; 00; 
4 • Costs of this action; and 
5. Such other and further relief as the Cot:.--t rr.ay dee.T, just 
and proper. 
c. Richarc Cranwell 
S. Pmy Arbucho 
~Nt~, FLOP..A & IDORE, P.C. 
P.O. Box 459 
Vinton, VA 24179 
OOROTHY T. MJRRISON 




V I R G I N I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF ROANOKE 










J. MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D., INC.) 





LAW NO. CL840087 
DEMURRER AND MOTION TO DISMISS 
COME NOW the defendants, by counsel, and file this their 
Demurrer and Motion to Dismiss and in support thereof state 
as follows: 
1. Plaintiff has instituted this action which is in the 
nature of a claim for medical malpractice against the defendants. 
2. Section 8.01-581.1 of the Code of Virginia as amended 
requires that before any such suit may be instituted, a notice 
of the plaintiff's intent to institute such claim and suit must 
be given to the health care providers and that after such. notice, 
no suit can be instituted for a period of ninety (90) days from 
the date of such notice. 
3. Such a notice was given by Plaintiff Dorothy Morrison 
to James Miqhae~ Bestler, M. D., a copy of whicp is attached 
hereto and is dated March ·10, 19·94. 
. . . --
77 




4. The plaintiff instituted the suit on the twelfth (12th) 
day of March, 1984, only two (2) days after said notice. 
5. Plaintiff's action is clearly prohibited by statute. 
WHEREFORE, these defendants pray that their Demurrer and 
Motion to Dismiss be sustained, and further pray that this 
case be dismissed. 
George W. Wooten, Esquire 
JAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, M. D. and 
J. MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D., INC. 
d/b/a COSMETIC SURGERY OF VIRGINIA 
I 
' . 
By _____ ~~;'~:~~~~~~=r---~/~i~/r}'~'-·-~1-~===-----/~ Of e&Unsel ' 
;' 
Woodward, Fox, Wooten & Hart, P. c. 
P. o. Box 12247 
Roanoke, Virginia 24024-2247 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, George w. Wooten, Esquire, Counsel for the Defendants, 
do hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to ·C. Richard Cranwell, Esquire and S. Amy Arbucho, Esquire, of 
Cranwell, Flora & Moore, P.C., P. 0. Box 459, Vinton, Virginia 
24179, Counsel for the Plaintiff, this 21st day of March, 1984. 
J George W. Woot~n 
·.~ -L 




& MOORE, P.C. 
VINTON. VIRGINIA 





Jar.es Mid"Qel BesUer, M.D. 
4 502 Starkey ibad 
Professional Park, Suite 100 
lbaroke, VA 24014 
1-W"c.'l 10, 1984 
Notice o_f Malpractice Claim Under §u. u.i.-;)OJ.. L. ol: me 
Code of Virginia 
J:brothy 1-brrison 
P.O. Box 2 
Blue Ridge, VA 24064 
CEiUIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPr ~ 
t p 380 316 583 
. PIZASE TAI<E OOIICE ti'lat Dlrothy M:>rrison will file a medical 
malpractice ac'-~on against Jat:es Michael Bestler, M.D. based on the 
following facts: 
1. That on 1-larch 10, 1982, Claimant, torothy M:;)rrison, aas 
a patie."lt of Dr. Janes M. Bestler, M.D. At this tirre, Claimant \JJ"der-
went treat:Te:"1t by Dr. BesUer which included a neck lift. 
2. 'n'lat durin; sud: treabtent, Dr. Bestler perfo:rned 
addi tiona! s-;;agica.l procedures which were neither requested or aut."orized 
by the Clailrcnt. 
3. That the surgicaJ. procedures perforned by Dr. Bestler 
were not pex=onted in o::r.plia.noe with the appropriate standard of care, 
causing the Claimant great pa.ill and suffering, physical disfigur~&t 
and enotiona.l distress. 
c. Richard Cranwell 
5. Plrrj Arbucho 
CRANWELL, FIOPA & MX>RE, P. C. 
P.O. Box 459 
Vinton, VA 24179 
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VIRGINIA: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR '!'HE COUNTY OF ROANOKE 
,DOROTHY T. MORRISON, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
~ \ IJAMES MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D. -~~ ~ and . 
. \. ~I J. MICHAEL BESTLER, M.D., INC. ~ ~ ~ d/b/a COSMETIC SURGERY OF 
~· , ~ I Defendants 
ORDER 
.. ~ ~').. VIRGINIA, 
'< I J \ 
\J ~· On this 13th day of November, 1984, came the plaintiff, 
by counsel, and moved for a nonsuit herein, pursuant to Section 
8.01-380 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, and the motion was argued 
I by counse 1 . 
' I 
UPON CONSIDEFATION WHEF.P.OF, it is ORDERED that plaintiff I 
LAW OFFICE 
CRANWEU.. FLORA 

















ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. The circuit court erred in holding that the 
notice and stay provisions of § 8.01-581.2 of the Code of 
Virginia limit the court's jurisdiction to hear medical 
malpractice cases. 
2. The circuit court erred in dismissing the 
appellant's motion for judgment as it was not barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
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